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Abstract
Recent research suggests that attributions of aliveness and mental capacities to faces are
influenced by social group membership. In this article, we investigated group related biases
in mind perception in participants from aWestern and Eastern culture, employing faces of
varying ethnic groups. In Experiment 1, Caucasian faces that ranged on a continuum from
real to artificial were evaluated by participants in the UK (in-group) and in India (out-group)
on animacy, abilities to plan and to feel pain, and having a mind. Human features were
found to be assigned to a greater extent to faces when these belonged to in-group mem-
bers, whereas out-group faces had to appear more realistic in order to be perceived as
human. When participants in India evaluated South Asian (in-group) and Caucasian (out-
group) faces in Experiment 2, the results closely mirrored those of the first experiment. For
both studies, ratings of out-group faces were significantly predicted by participants’ levels of
ethnocultural empathy. The findings highlight the role of intergroup processes (i.e., in-group
favoritism, out-group dehumanization) in the perception of human and mental qualities and
point to ethnocultural empathy as an important factor in responses to out-groups.
Introduction
One of the most fundamental interpersonal goals is to establish and maintain a meaningful
connection with fellow humans. This can only be achieved once we detect another mind to
connect with [1]. Hence, for social behavior to occur, it is crucial to attribute mental states both
to the self and to other actors, and to consider their intentions, attitudes, beliefs, and emotions.
Such ability has been referred to as Theory of Mind (ToM) [2] or mentalizing [3]. It is assumed
that through inference or simulation of the content of people’s minds, we are able to under-
stand their ongoing actions, predict future behavior, and coordinate it with our own [4].
Imputing others with an independent mind in fact constitutes the core of perceiving them as
complete human beings with moral status [5]. Yet, however natural it is for us to expect that
others have minds, those minds are after all inaccessible and their presence is ultimately a mat-
ter of perceptual processes. In this paper, we investigate how the perception of mind behind
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human faces varies with ethnic group membership and to what extent it is influenced by the
perceiver’s empathic ability.
With recent advances in computer technology, an increasing attention is being devoted to
how people perceive non-living entities, for example virtual agents, avatars, and robots [6,7].
Their visual appearance acts as an important cue to social perception and has an impact on the
assumption of capabilities (e.g., [8,9]). Research has shown that people effortlessly distinguish
between real and artificial faces [10,11], with stronger and sustained neural activity in response
to natural human faces [12,13]. Furthermore, human characteristics, including mental states,
are ascribed to a greater extent to more anthropomorphic representations of computer inter-
faces (e.g., [14]). In a study by Krach and colleagues [15], for instance, an anthropomorphic
robot was considered more pleasant to interact with than a functional, machine-like robot and
this led to enhanced cortical activity in brain regions implicated in the ToM network. The ten-
dency to infer mental states thus seems to increase with the human realistic appearance of arti-
ficial entities.
Nonetheless, the presence of mind behind faces of varying realism is not continuous, but
rather categorical. That is, faces are judged dichotomously as either alive, i.e., possessing mental
states, or not [16,17]. In a recent study, Looser and Wheatley [16] demonstrated that on a con-
tinuum of faces modified from naturally ‘human’ to ‘artificial’ through a range of morphs
between the two, faces that fell closer to the artificial endpoint were ascribed diminished levels
of animacy and mental capacities of planning, feeling pain, and having a mind. Moreover, the
point across the morphs’ continua at which faces were equally likely to be perceived as animate
or inanimate—the point of subjective equality (PSE)—was found to be shifted towards the
human endpoint. This suggested that attributions of animacy do not translate 1:1 onto the
actual percentage of the humanness of a face, but instead are shaped by additional mechanisms
involved in the perception of mind.
Having a mind is an important element of the concept of humanness. The self and one’s in-
group are typically the best embodiments of the category of humans and are granted the full
scope of human features (e.g., [18]). While the in-group is the source of positive identity and
positive distinctiveness from other groups, out-group members are generally less favored and
often viewed as less human than in-group members [19]. In particular, they are seen as lacking
complex human feelings [20], as well as identity, status, and certain personality traits [21,22].
The failure to attribute traits that are unique or natural to all human beings may then reduce
out-group members to animals or machines and deprive them of their moral value (see [23]).
Although dehumanization has been the focus of numerous studies that relied on descriptive
representations of social groups (e.g., [24,25,26]), only little research so far used visual, and
here specifically facial, stimuli (see [27,28]). One study by Hackel, Looser, and Bavel [29]
recently explored the aspect of dementalization as evoked by faces and showed that group
membership was one of the top-down motivations that shaped mind perception. Building on
the findings by Looser andWheatley [16], they had participants evaluate continua of facial
morphs introduced as in-group or out-group members based on both minimal group assign-
ment and labels of academic and political affiliation. Participants were found to apply stricter
thresholds for seeing mind behind out-group faces and this bias was particularly pronounced
for those who strongly identified with their in-group. The results provided first evidence that
the degree of perceiving a mind in the other is contingent upon social dynamics, which thereby
interact with basic perceptual processes. The question then arises to what extent the above
effects generalize to other targets and perceivers.
Mind Perception of Faces
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Aims of Present Research
Studies by Looser and Wheatley [16] and Hackel and colleagues [29], like the overwhelming
majority of research on mind perception and dementalization, were conducted with predomi-
nantly White participants in a Western society (USA). This engenders the issue of cross-cul-
tural generalizability of the findings. The aim of our research was therefore to extend previous
work by contributing a cross-cultural comparison to the study of intergroup bias in perceptions
of animacy and mind, conducted with a diversified sample of participants drawn from aWest-
ern (UK) and an Eastern (India) culture. We consider the continua of faces of varying realism
to have a great potential as probes for social attitudes in an intergroup context. We further
appropriated the original paradigm from Looser and Wheatley [16] in a way that the gradual
change of faces on the morphs’ continua did not entail modifications to facial morphology.
To move beyond the use of the minimal group paradigm and category labels for social
groups, as in Hackel and colleagues [29], we employed the faces to represent members of dis-
tinct ethnic groups. Racial or ethnic group membership is the most basic cue to rapid social cat-
egorization, besides age and gender, and has been a common foundation of research on
prejudice. In many studies that used single faces or facial sequences of varying skin color (e.g.,
[30,31,32], participants’ responses to the facial stimuli were predicted by their levels of disposi-
tion (i.e., prejudice).
Given that mind perception necessitates the recognition of one’s moral status [33] and the
motivation to grant moral regard to others is thought to be facilitated by empathy [34], we
regarded people’s ability to share the feelings and perspectives of out-group members as an
essential variable. This assumption is supported by evidence showing that out-groups evoke
overall less empathic responses than in-groups and their suffering is less likely to be attended
to [35,36]. In extreme cases, they may be even excluded from moral considerations (e.g., [37]).
Therefore, instead of focusing on the role of prejudice in shaping perceptions of out-groups,
our key variable in predicting judgments of animacy and mental capacities of out-group mem-
bers was ethnocultural empathy. The construct’s operationalization is parallel to general empa-
thy (e.g., [38]), except that it incorporates the aspect of cultural differences [39].
Overview of Studies
In Experiment 1, Caucasian faces ranging from real to artificial were evaluated by participants
in the UK and India on animacy, abilities to plan and to feel pain, and having a mind, in accord
with Looser andWheatley [16] and Hackel and colleagues [29]. Following the predictions pro-
vided by research on humanness and its denial to out-groups, we hypothesized that partici-
pants in the UK would perceive Caucasian (in-group) faces to be more alive and to experience
mental states to a greater degree, compared to participants in India, for whom the same faces
would represent an out-group. We also hypothesized that for participants in India the Cauca-
sian (out-group) faces would need to look more human-like in order to be seen as human, with
the PSE being shifted closer to the human endpoint of the morphs’ continua. Attributions of all
characteristics should decrease as the faces approach the artificial endpoint of the continua. In
Experiment 2, participants from India not only evaluated Caucasian (out-group) faces, but also
South Asian (in-group) faces, with results predicted to closely mirror those of the UK partici-
pants judging Caucasian (in-group) faces in Experiment 1. For both studies, we hypothesized
that individual differences in ethnocultural empathy would predict ratings of out-group, but
not in-group, faces by participants in the UK and India.
Mind Perception of Faces
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Experiment 1
The first experiment explored the process of out-group dementalization for Caucasian faces,
whereby participants in the UK and India rated the faces ranging from real to artificial on ani-
macy, abilities to plan and to feel pain, and having a mind.
Method
Ethics statement. The experiment was conducted with ethics approval from the School of
Psychology at Cardiff University, United Kingdom and the Department of Psychology, Karna-
tak University, India. All participants gave informed written consent before testing.
Participants. Thirty-three White British students at Cardiff University, United Kingdom
(19 women;Mage = 22.15 years, SD = 5.15) and forty-four South Asian students at Karnatak
University, India (22 women;Mage = 24.14 years, SD = 1.94) took part in the experiment on a
voluntary basis. All participants completed the study in English, but were natives of the country
in which they participated. None indicated familiarity with the stimuli. Informed consent was
obtained prior to the experiment.
Stimulus material. Ten photographs of neutral faces of Caucasian men were selected
from the Center for Vital Longevity Face Database [40]. They formed the human endpoint of
the images’ continua. Modifications to the facial texture in each photograph were applied in
Photoshop CS3 (Adobe Systems Inc., California, USA) by a professional graphics artist to cre-
ate the faces’ artificial analogues, constituting the artificial endpoint. To obtain the intermedi-
ate images along the visual continuum, nine morphs with equal increments of physical change
between every human face and its artificial equivalent were generated using FantaMorph 3.7.1
software (Abrosoft Co., Beijing, China). Thus, each of the 10 original faces had 11 variants
(human, 9 morphs, artificial), which added up to 110 facial stimuli (10 faces x 11 variants).
They were displayed in color on white background and measured 688 x 652 pixels (see Fig 1A).
Design and procedure. Stimulus evaluation was blocked for every measure, with all 110
images in each block. The experiment always started with evaluations of animacy and
pleasantness. Ratings were made on 7-point Likert scales, with response options ranging from 1
—definitely not alive to 7—definitely alive for animacy, and 1—very unpleasant to 7—very
pleasant for pleasantness. This was followed by evaluations of the faces’ abilities to feel pain
and to formulate a plan, as well as whether the target possessed amind. For these three ques-
tions the response options ranged from 1- definitely not to 7 –definitely yes. The ordering of the
blocks was counterbalanced with the exception ofmind, which was always presented last (see
[16]). The facial stimuli within a block were shown in a random sequence and remained on the
screen until a response was given. The experimental task was delivered by Python 2.7 (Python
Software Foundation, Oregon, USA).
Participants were tested individually. After completion of the ratings, they filled out a
paper-and-pencil version of the Scale of Ethnocultural Empathy [39]. It consists of 31 items
targeting four dimensions of ethnocultural sensitivity: (a) Empathic feeling and expression, (b)
Empathic perspective taking, (c) Acceptance of cultural differences, and (d) Empathic aware-
ness. For all items response options ranged from 1 –strongly disagree to 6 –strongly agree.
Results
Data preparation. Average scores were obtained across all facial exemplars for each of the
11 images of the morphs’ continua. In line with Looser and Wheatley [16], the resulting 11
image means were then linearly transformed from the original 7-point Likert scales into scores
ranging from 0 to 1 (with higher scores indicating greater levels of the dimension). To obtain
psychometric curves for the dependent measures, the standardized scores were fitted with a
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Gaussian distribution in GraphPad Prism 6 (GraphPad Software Inc., California, USA). This
provided an overall fit index of participants’ judgment data to the mean estimated slope (see r2
in Fig 1B) and allowed the calculation of the Point of Subjective Equality (PSE). Outliers were
identified on the individual PSE values for each participant falling beyond theM ± 2.5 SD
range and were treated as missing data in the PSE analyses. For ratings of pleasantness, which
did not fit a sigmoidal but a linear function (see also [16]), no PSE values could be calculated.
Participants’ gender was excluded from all analyses due to lack of any significant effects of this
variable in preliminary tests.
Analyses of variance. Amultivariate repeated measures analysis of variance (RM-MA-
NOVA) with Participant Sample (UK, India) as a between-subjects factor and Morph Level
(1–11) as a within-subjects factor was performed on the standardized scores of animacy, pleas-
antness, pain, plan, andmind. For all univariate analyses, a Greenhouse-Geisser adjustment to
degrees of freedom was applied and Sidak correction was used for multiple comparisons.
Significant multivariate effects emerged for Morph Level, F(50, 3700) = 17.65, p< .001, ηp
2
= .19, and Morph Level × Participant Sample, F(50, 3700) = 5.00, p< .001, ηp
2 = .06. In univar-
iate terms, the interaction between Morph Level and Participant Sample was significant for all
measures of interest: animacy, F(1.92, 74) = 6.06, p = .003, ηp
2 = .08; pleasantness, F(1.51, 74) =
6.36, p = .005, ηp
2 = .08; plan, F(1.63, 74) = 6.43, p = .004, ηp
2 = .08; pain, F(1.73, 74) = 11.41, p
< .001, ηp
2 = .13; andmind, F(2.01, 74) = 8.60, p< .001, ηp
2 = .10.
Pairwise comparisons showed that participants in India perceived the facial images located
towards the artificial end of the morphs’ continua as more alive (morph 3, p = .044), more able
to formulate a plan (morph 1, p = .033) and to feel pain (morphs 1–3, ps< .01), and more likely
to possess amind (morphs 1–4, ps< .05) than the UK sample. The inverse was true for the
opposite end of the continua. Here, participants in the UK rated the images belonging to the
Fig 1. Stimulus example and results for Experiment 1. A. Example of a Caucasian target with 11 variants
from artificial to human (right side) as used in Experiment 1. B. India and UK samples’ average ratings of
Caucasian targets at each point along the morph continuum including error bars (SEM) and the fitted curves
(solid lines) per measure. r2 = model fit index.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0137840.g001
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human end as more alive (morphs 9–11, ps< .05), more capable of formulating a plan
(morphs 8–11, ps< .01) and feeling pain (morphs 7–11, ps< .05), and more likely to possess a
mind (morphs 8–11, ps< .05) than participants in India. Interestingly, participants in the UK
also rated the faces along the artificial half to be more pleasant than did the Indian participants
(morphs 1–6, ps< .05) (see Fig 1B).
Point of Subjective Equality (PSE) analyses. For each sample (UK, India), PSE values
were derived from the fitted curves in GraphPad Prism 6 where the face ratings correspond to
the ordinate midpoint of a measure (horizontal line at value 0.5 in figures). In accordance with
Looser and Wheatley’s [16] reasoning, if perceptions of animacy are presumed to linearly map
onto the percentage of the human face in every morph, then the point at which the face is
equally likely to be judged as animate or inanimate should correspond to morph 6 on the
abscissa where the face is half animate/inanimate (50%). As can be seen in Table 1, consider-
able deviations of the PSE values from the morphs’ continua midpoint were observed for both
samples on animacy, plan and pain, ts> 2.0, ps .05, and for the UK sample onmind, t(32) =
4.10, p< .001, indicating a shift in perception thresholds towards the human endpoint.
To test for significant differences in PSE values between the UK and Indian sample, a multi-
variate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with Participant Sample (India, UK) as a between-
subjects factor was performed on the PSE scores for animacy, pain, plan, andmind. As pre-
dicted, the multivariate main effect was significant for Participant Sample, F(4, 59) = 3.93, p =
.007, ηp
2 = .21, with participants in India generally displaying higher thresholds for attributing
human traits to Caucasian faces than participants in the UK. On the univariate level, this differ-
ence was statistically significant for plan, F(1, 62) = 10.34, p< .001, ηp
2 = .14, and marginally
significant for pain, F(1, 62) = 3.64, p = .061, ηp
2 = .06.
Regressions. Regression analyses were performed to test whether the degree of ethnocul-
tural empathy of participants in the UK and India significantly predicted the PSE values for the
four measures. Results revealed that only for the Indian sample the PSE value for animacy was
significantly predicted by their overall ethnocultural empathy score, β = −.34, t(39) = −2.24, p =
.031. In order to demonstrate that the effect of ethnocultural empathy was specific to Indian
participants viewing Caucasian faces, we submitted participants’ PSE scores of animacy to a
Participant Sample (1 = India, -1 = UK) × Ethnocultural Empathy multiple regression analysis.
Due to the bimodal distribution of the ethnocultural empathy data (with peaks at values 110
and 135) a median split (127.5) was performed on the variable, thereby revealing the hypothe-
sized interaction with Participant Sample when entered as a categorical variable in the multiple
regression analysis, β = 1.18, t(71) = 2.49, p = .015. Specifically, Indian participants displayed
elevated thresholds for perceiving Caucasian faces as alive when they scored low rather than
high on ethnocultural empathy (Mlow = 8.89 vs.Mhigh = 6.33, p = .001). For participants in the
UK, PSE values for animacy did not significantly vary with the degree of ethnocultural empathy
(Mlow = 6.91 vs.Mhigh = 6.99, p = .922).
Table 1. Mean PSE Values per Measure in Experiment 1.
UK sample India sample
Measure M (SD) M (SD)
Animacy 6.96 (1.51) 7.28 (1.86)
Pain 7.06 (1.23) 7.63 (1.16)
Plan 6.81 (1.09) 8.09 (1.98)
Mind 6.83 (1.17) 7.26 (1.72)
Note. Mean PSE values are given in terms of the original morph numbers (1–11).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0137840.t001
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Discussion
Participants in the UK generally perceived the faces as more alive, more likely to possess a
mind, and more able to feel pain and to formulate a plan than participants in India. At the
same time, participants in India evaluated the faces towards the artificial endpoint of the
morphs’ continua higher on these traits than participants in the UK. These results suggest that
participants in the UK, who viewed the in-group faces and judged them to be more human-like
than participants in India, favored the in-group in the attribution of ToM qualities. They were
more conservative than participants in India in attributing those qualities when the faces
became more artificial.
In line with Looser andWheatley [16] and Hackel and colleagues [29], the PSEs shifted
towards the human endpoint of the morphs’ continua. When comparing the two samples, the
Indian participants’ PSE for plan and pain was closer to the human endpoint than that of UK
participants, suggesting subtle out-group dehumanization as Caucasian faces needed to look
more human-like in order for them to be seen as able to formulate a plan and feel pain. Fur-
thermore, the PSE for animacy was significantly predicted for the Indian but not for the UK
sample by the degree of ethnocultural empathy, indicating the involvement of ethnocultural
sensitivity in the perception of out-group, but not in-group, faces.
Experiment 2
The purpose of the second experiment was to investigate how participants in India evaluated
South Asian faces, representing their in-group, and Caucasian faces with respect to animacy,
abilities to plan and to feel pain, and having a mind.
Method
Ethics statement. The experiment was conducted with ethics approval from the Depart-
ment of Psychology, Karnatak University, India. All participants gave informed written con-
sent before testing.
Participants. Sixty-six young adults (29 women), age range 21–31 years (M = 23.29,
SD = 2.01) at Karnatak University, India, volunteered to take part in Experiment 2. All partici-
pants completed the study in English, but were natives of India. None had participated in the
previous study and indicated familiarity with the stimuli. Informed consent was obtained prior
to participation.
Stimulus material. In addition to the Caucasian faces from Experiment 1, ten photo-
graphs of neutral faces of South Asian men were selected from the Center for Vital Longevity
Face Database [40] to depict the human endpoint of the morphs’ continua. The faces matched
those of the Caucasian targets considering attractiveness (M = 1.9), intelligence (M = 2.77),
trustworthiness (M = 2.55), and likeability (M = 2.67; scale 1–5, all ps> .05), as determined in
a pilot study (n = 30). The faces’ artificial analogues were generated in Photoshop CS3 (Adobe
Systems Inc., California, USA) in the same way as in Experiment 1 and morphed with the
human photographs in FantaMorph 3.7.1 software (Abrosoft Co., Beijing, China) to create the
11 variants of each of the 10 target faces. The final set consisting of 110 South Asian and 110
Caucasian facial stimuli was displayed in color on white background and measured 688 x 652
pixels (see Fig 2A for an example of a South Asian face).
Design and procedure. Design and procedure were identical to Experiment 1. Partici-
pants were randomly assigned to view either South Asian or Caucasian faces.
Mind Perception of Faces
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Results
The data preparation steps followed exactly those in Experiment 1. The model fit values (r2)
are indicated in Fig 2B.
Analyses of variance. A RM-MANOVA with Target Ethnicity (South Asian, Caucasian)
as a between-subjects factor and Morph Level (1–11) as a within-subjects factor was performed
on the standardized scores of animacy, pleasantness, pain, plan, andmind. For all univariate
analyses, a Greenhouse-Geisser adjustment to degrees of freedom was applied and Sidak cor-
rection was used for multiple comparisons.
Significant multivariate effects emerged for Morph Level, F(50, 3200) = 12.50, p< .001, ηp
2
= .16, and Morph Level × Target Ethnicity, F(50, 3200) = 2.30, p< .001, ηp
2 = .04. In univariate
terms, the interaction between Morph Level and Target Ethnicity was significant for all mea-
sures: animacy, F(2.24, 64) = 4.22, p = .013, ηp
2 = .06; pleasantness, F(1.71, 64) = 4.38, p = .020,
ηp
2 = .06; plan, F(2.03, 64) = 9.16, p< .001, ηp
2 = .13; pain, F(2.00, 64) = 6.49, p = .002, ηp
2 =
.09; andmind, F(2.05, 64) = 6.59, p = .002, ηp
2 = .09.
Pairwise comparisons showed that Caucasian faces were rated towards the artificial end of
the morphs’ continua as more able to formulate a plan (morph 3, p = .034) and to feel pain
(morphs 1–4, ps< .05) than South Asian faces. The inverse was true for the human end of the
continua. Here, South Asian Faces were rated as more alive (morphs 6–8 and 10–11, ps< .05),
more pleasant (morphs 7–8 and 11, ps< .05), more capable of formulating a plan (morphs
7–11, ps< .01) and feeling pain (morphs 8–11, ps< .05), and more likely to have amind
(morphs 7–11, ps< .05) compared to Caucasian faces (see Fig 2B).
PSE analyses. Due to violations of the assumption of homogeneity of variance, differences
in PSE scores from the morphs’ continua midpoint (morph 6) were analyzed using a nonpara-
metric one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank test. As can be seen in Table 2, significant deviations
Fig 2. Stimulus example and results for Experiment 2. A. Example of a South Asian target with 11
variants from artificial to human (right side) as used in Experiment 2. B. Indian participants’ average ratings of
South Asian and Caucasian targets at each point along the morph continuum including error bars (SEM) and
the fitted curves (solid lines) per measure. r2 = model fit index.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0137840.g002
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of the PSE values from the midpoint were observed for both types of faces on pain, Zs> 2.2, ps
< .05, and for Caucasian faces on animacy, Z = 2.75, p = .006; plan, Z = 2.50, p = .012; and
mind, Z = 2.14, p = .032, suggesting that perception thresholds were shifted towards the human
endpoint.
In order to test for significant differences in PSE values between South Asian and Caucasian
faces, a MANOVA with Target Ethnicity (South Asian, Caucasian) as a between-subjects factor
was performed on the log-transformed PSE scores for animacy, pain, plan, andmind. As pre-
dicted, the main effect of Target Ethnicity was significant on the multivariate level, F(4, 40) =
5.97, p = .001, ηp
2 = .37. The same applied to all measures on the univariate level, animacy, F-
(1, 43) = 9.27, p = .004, ηp
2 = .18; plan, F(1, 43) = 18.20, p< .001, ηp
2 = .30; pain, F(1, 43) =
6.73, p = .013, ηp
2 = .14; andmind, F(1, 43) = 18.10, p< .001, ηp
2 = .30, with higher thresholds
for perceiving human traits in Caucasian faces compared to South Asian faces.
Regressions. Regressions analyses showed that Indian participants’ ethnocultural empathy
score was a marginal significant predictor of the PSE value for animacy (log-transformed) only
for Caucasian targets, β = −.37, t(27) = −2.02, p = .054. In order to demonstrate that the effect
of ethnocultural empathy was specific to Indian participants viewing Caucasian faces, we sub-
mitted participants’ log-transformed PSE scores of animacy to a Target Ethnicity (1 = Caucasian
target, -1 = South Asian target) × Ethnocultural Empathy multiple regression analysis. Due to
the bimodal distribution of the ethnocultural empathy data (with peaks at values 120 and 140)
a median split (128.0) was performed on the variable, thereby revealing the hypothesized inter-
action with Target Ethnicity when entered as a categorical variable in the multiple regression
analysis, β = -.81, t(57) = -2.01, p = .049. Specifically, Indian participants displayed elevated
thresholds for perceiving Caucasian faces as alive when they scored low rather than high on
ethnocultural empathy (LogMlow = .96 vs. LogMhigh = .77, p = .003). This was not the case
when evaluating South Asian faces for which thresholds of animacy did not significantly vary
as a function of ethnocultural empathy (LogMlow = .79 vs. LogMhigh = .77, p = .774).
Discussion
This experiment demonstrated that participants in India perceived the South Asian (in-group)
faces as more alive, more pleasant, better able to formulate a plan and to feel pain, as well as
more likely to possess amind than the Caucasian (out-group) faces. These observations corre-
spond to the in-group favoritism in the attribution of ToM qualities found in Experiment 1.
Participants were also more conservative in attributing plan and pain to South Asian faces
when these became artificial. In addition, the present data validated the effect of out-group
dehumanization. This was shown by the PSE values falling closer to the human endpoint of the
morphs’ continua for Caucasian compared to South Asian faces, suggesting that out-group
faces needed to be more human-like in order to be considered by participants in India as
Table 2. Mean PSE Values per Measure in Experiment 2.
South Asian targets Caucasian targets
Measure M (SD) M (SD)
Animacy 6.58 (2.30) 7.88 (2.63)
Pain 6.59 (1.80) 8.02 (3.18)
Plan 6.37 (1.17) 7.82 (3.15)
Mind 6.02 (2.61) 7.94 (3.44)
Note. Mean PSE values are given in terms of the original morph numbers (1–11).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0137840.t002
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possessing human traits. Replicating the findings from the first study, ethnocultural empathy
emerged again as a significant predictor of the PSE for animacy in ratings of out-group, but not
in-group, faces.
General Discussion
The main goal of our research was to examine whether intergroup biases in mind perception
generalize across cultures. Whilst previous work has employed minimal and academic/ politi-
cal affiliation groups [29], we pursued the topic of mind perception in a context where partici-
pants from both Western (UK) and Eastern (India) cultural backgrounds assessed ethnically
diversified faces that represented their respective in-group and out-group. In Experiment 1, the
results showed that participants in the UK perceived the Caucasian faces towards the human
endpoint of the morphs’ continua to be more alive, more able to formulate a plan and to feel
pain, and more likely to possess a mind than participants in India. Participants in India
ascribed these traits to a greater degree to the Caucasian faces situated towards the artificial
endpoint of the morphs’ continua. Furthermore, they judged the PSE for plan and pain to fall
closer to the human endpoint than participants in the UK. In Experiment 2, the results closely
mirrored those of the first study in that participants in India perceived the South Asian faces as
being more alive, more able to plan and feel pain, and more likely to have a mind than Cauca-
sian faces, and this was again true for the human endpoint of the morphs’ continua.
Together, these findings extend those by Looser andWheatley [16] and Hackel and col-
leagues [29] by revealing an in-group bias in the perception of ToM characteristics for partici-
pants in the UK as well as in India. Moreover, evidence was found for subtle out-group
derogation. The differences in the PSE were indicative of out-group dementalization for partic-
ipants in India, whereby Caucasian faces had to look more human-like than South Asian faces
in order to be recognized as possessing human traits. To our knowledge, this is the first study
that employed in-group and out-group faces with varying levels of artificiality to investigate
intergroup attitudes in a cross-cultural context. Ethnicity as a basis for the division into an in-
group and an out-group served as an ecologically valid cue for group membership and went
beyond the widely studied racial categories (i.e., Blacks/Whites, see [41] for a review).
Participants’ tendency to attribute animacy and mental capacities to a greater degree to the
faces positioned closer to the human endpoint of the morphs’ continua may be interpreted as
an attempt to reserve these qualities only for faces that could be unquestionably categorized as
belonging to the respective in-groups. As the faces progressively became artificial, an ambiguity
as to whether they still represented the in-group members might have arisen. Such increasing
artificiality consequently made participants more conservative in attributing human-like traits
to in-group members. This paradoxical effect is consistent with the in-group over-exclusion
phenomenon [42,43]. It is manifested in a bias to accept fewer individuals into the in-group
than to the out-group, which shields the former from erroneous inclusion of those who do not
belong and thus enables the in-group to maintain integrity. The protection of the in-group’s
humanness from contamination with nonhuman (e.g., animal-like) features has been found
previously in the context of cultural groups (Northern and Southern Italians; [44]). Our find-
ings may suggest a corresponding effect for the protection of the in-group’s mind from con-
tamination with object-like, mindless artificial entities.
The evaluations of the other’s humanness further turned out to be shaped by the subjectivity
of the perceiver, that is, by the level of ethnocultural empathy. Ethnocultural empathy was a
significant predictor of the PSE values for animacy when the target faces represented the out-
group. No such effect occurred for the in-group faces. This highlights the impact of disposi-
tional variables on basic perceptual processes, particularly on categorization according to one
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of the most fundamental distinctions between the animate and inanimate (e.g., [45]). The ques-
tion of what is alive and what is not therefore seems to rely less on objective criteria (e.g., real-
ism) applied to the target. Instead, the variation in judgments of life depending on one’s group
membership indicates that the “tipping point of animacy” (p. 1854, [16]) may be determined
by what the face stands for on a higher, i.e., group, level. Presently, empathy towards cultural/
ethnic groups was found to act as a driving force in intergroup perception and to mitigate its
negative aspect of out-group dementalization [46]. Interestingly, this was the case for attribu-
tions of animacy, but not for other variables such as pain, plan or mind. Future research might
want to follow up on those specific findings, thereby making an explicit distinction between
agency and experience related traits as two components of mind perception when exploring
the role of ethnocultural empathy [29,33].
Empathy is viewed as a skill that can be trained and engaged to foster positive out-group
attitudes and improve intergroup relations [47,48]. Accordingly, ethnocultural empathy
appears to be a proper instrument for combating biases that automatically emerge at an early
stage of human perception and determine later derogative responses. Interventions designed to
boost empathy towards out-groups often concentrate on the development of the perspective
taking ability, which is an important constituent of cultural-specific empathy and has been
shown to weaken intergroup prejudice [49,50]. Contemporary empathy training turns to artifi-
cial characters to symbolize out-group members in virtual realities and demonstrates that iden-
tification with such entities, achieved through the experience of ownership of another’s body or
body parts, successfully decreases implicit racial bias [51,52].
Despite the fact that the realism of computer-generated entities may be sufficient for the
user to establish an effective connection with them, the creation of highly human-like charac-
ters, and especially of photorealistic faces, remains one of the “ultimate challenges” in the fields
of computer graphics and animation (e.g., [6]). Major efforts have been devoted to perfecting
the potentially problematic elements of faces, but this was typically done as if these were a col-
lection of separate features, colors, and textures (e.g., [53,54]). Nevertheless, in the end even a
very authentic face may be imbued with less human qualities and consequently elicit less social
reactions if it represents an out-group member. Throughout the paper, we showed that percep-
tions of humanness stem from what the face stands for as a social construct and we underlined
that group membership plays a central role in how alive it appears and to what extent mental
capacities are attributed to it.
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